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While in my view some of the criticisms 
raised are unrealistic, defeatist or 
just plain wrong, I will not attempt a 
detailed response to all of them. Some 
are about the problem the bill addresses; 
some are from a particular ideological 
perspective, questioning the real or 
imagined ideological foundations of the 
bill; others concern public policy issues 
and the values and capabilities of the 
policy advisory system, weaknesses in 
our democratic institutions, and quite 
technical legal and constitutional issues. 
No one has professional expertise in all 
of these matters, and so the issues would 
best be debated in depth amongst people 
with the various skills appropriate to the 
different kinds of issues being raised. 
In setting up the taskforce to ‘carry 
forward the work of the Commerce 
Committee’, the terms of reference from 
the government state:
National and ACT have agreed that it 
is desirable in principle to legislate for 
principle-based regulatory policies as a 
complement to the principles for fiscal 
policy that are contained in the Public 
Finance Act ... The prime objective of 
the Taskforce is to determine what, if 
any amendments to the Bill would best 
achieve its objectives as specified in 
its preamble, while addressing where 
necessary the concerns about it that 
The Institute of Policy Studies seminar held in response to 
the publication of the report of the Regulatory Responsibility 
Taskforce, which I chaired, provided a useful forum in 
which to expose and debate issues raised by the report and 
its proposed Regulatory Responsibility Bill. I expect that it 
will be one of many such occasions over the coming months 
for those with an interest in the issues it raised to refine 
their understanding and their positions. I appreciate this 
opportunity to respond to some of the more significant 
issues that contributors to the seminar raised. However, in 
doing so I must declare that, as the taskforce was disbanded 
when it completed its assignment, I can contribute only as 
an individual and cannot represent the views of the taskforce 
on the issues beyond what is in its report. I gratefully 
acknowledge the comments I have received from Richard 
Clarke and Bryce Wilkinson that were given on the same 
basis.
Graham Scott
Graham Scott was the Chair of the Regulatory 
Responsibility Taskforce and is a former 
Secretary to the Treasury.
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were considered by the Commerce 
Committee, or are raised in the course 
of the Taskforce’s deliberations. 
This is what the taskforce did. 
Questions about the problem the bill 
addresses and alternative solutions are 
covered briefly in the report, but the 
response to these quotes from the terms 
of reference is the core of its report. 
For readers unfamiliar with the content 
of the bill, it can be briefly summarised as 
follows:
• Purpose: an accountability and 
transparency measure to improve 
the quality of parliamentary laws, 
regulations, and other kinds of 
legislation. ‘Legislation’ is very broadly 
defined to avoid distorting the flow 
of regulation into uncontrolled 
channels.
• The scheme:
– specifies regulatory principles; 
– requires statements of compatibility 
with the principles;
– allows for declared departures 
from the principles, similar to the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act;
– grants courts the power to declare 
incompatibility.
• There are six principles of sound 
regulation, drawn from the Legislation 
Advisory Committee (LAC) guidelines, 
Cabinet Manual, parliamentary 
standing orders relating to review of 
regulations, and other sources:
1 Rule of law: legislation should ob-
serve the rule of law, meaning in 
particular: equality before the law; 
access and clarity; no retrospec-
tivity; rights and liabilities deter-
mined by the law rather than by 
administrative discretion.
2 Liberty: legislation should not di-
minish a person’s liberty, personal 
security, freedom of choice or 
property rights except as necessary 
to protect the liberty of others. 
3 Taking of property: legislation 
should not take or impair prop-
erty without consent unless neces-
sary in the public interest and with 
compensation.
4 Taxes and charges: taxes should not 
be imposed except by an act and 
charges should not exceed reason-
able cost or the benefit received.
5 Role of the courts: legislation 
should preserve the role of courts 
in determining the meaning of 
legislation; and, where legislation 
provides for administrative deci-
sions affecting people or property, 
it should make clear the criteria for 
such decisions and provide a right 
of appeal on the merits to a court 
or other independent body.
6 Good law-making: consultation 
is required; there is evaluation of 
the need for the legislation and its 
effects and possible adverse conse-
quences; benefits should outweigh 
costs, and legislation should be 
effective, efficient and proportion-
ate. 
• ‘Any incompatibility with the 
principles is justified to the extent 
that it is reasonable and can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’ (New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act).
• Certification of compatibility or 
otherwise with these principles is 
required by a minister (and responsible 
official except for the justified 
incompatibility provision). 
• The superior courts may make 
declarations of incompatibility with 
the principles, but may not grant 
injunctions or compensatory orders 
for breach of the principles or the bill. 
Declarations are not binding on the 
parties to the proceedings, and have no 
effect on the validity or enforcement 
of the legislation at issue.
• Interpretation of provisions is similar 
to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
The problem
While some of the criticisms made 
are peripheral to the mandate of the 
taskforce, some of these deserve comment 
as they will continue to come up in the 
debate over the coming months. One 
such issue is whether there is a problem 
of poor-quality legislation. Of the critical 
presentations at the Institute of Policy 
Studies seminar, some questioned whether 
there is a problem to be addressed at all, 
others said there is, and one said both of 
these things. Those who see a problem 
divide into those who think it cannot be 
solved and is just the price of democracy; 
those who don’t think the bill provides 
a workable solution; those who worry 
that the bill would chill the processes of 
regulation and leave things that should 
be regulated unregulated; and those who 
think alternative proposals would work 
better. 
The submissions to the Commerce 
Committee produced a stream of views 
that there is a serious problem with 
the extent and quality of regulation. 
The government has accepted this 
in principle, as seen in the terms of 
reference it mandated the taskforce with. 
The previous government introduced 
important changes in regulatory processes, 
and the current government expressed its 
concerns with its statement in August 2009 
(English and Hide, 2009). The perspective 
of the taskforce on the problem is 
presented in its report and highlights 
basic constitutional principles about 
good law that are described in various 
documents, including standing orders 
of Parliament, the Cabinet Manual and 
LAC guidelines. The last describe in effect 
a checklist of processes and substantive 
principles for testing legislative proposals. 
New Zealand’s unicameral legislature and 
its courts, which abide by the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy, provide few 
Some experienced 
former ministers 
have described 
the process of 
legislation as 
being occasionally 
fraught, messy, 
pressured, poorly 
informed and 
characterised 
by political point 
scoring, horse 
trading and 
compromising.
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checks and balances once legislation is 
introduced into the House. George Tanner’s 
paper to the seminar sees the problem in 
the three-year parliamentary term, and 
that it has possibly been made worse by 
MMP. He has commented that many of 
the 1,900 or so statutes and thousands 
of regulations are pretty low grade (see 
Fallow, 2010). Some experienced former 
ministers have described the process of 
legislation as being occasionally fraught, 
messy, pressured, poorly informed and 
characterised by political point scoring, 
horse trading and compromising. 
The process through which the 
proposal for a law to promote better 
legislation has come thus far has revealed 
a widespread agreement that there is a 
problem to be addressed. No doubt the 
definition of the problem and its probable 
causes will be refined as attempts to raise 
quality evolve. But two governments, of 
different persuasions, have acknowledged 
the problem and taken administrative 
steps to improve it. The problem requires 
a more muscular solution which tests 
the process against principles of good 
legislation, improves transparency and 
tightens accountability for quality with 
an independent mechanism for review. 
The taskforce’s advice is based on the 
proposition that the LAC guidelines, 
the requirements for regulatory impact 
statements and the work of the Regulations 
Review Committee have not had the 
desired effect, and that something stronger 
is needed to require policy makers to take 
more care in the exercise of regulatory 
powers by embedding more deeply into 
the processes principles that provide a 
standard by which to judge the quality of 
legislation. The LAC noted its concerns in 
2007 that policy development is weakened 
by the absence of mandatory compliance 
with its guidelines. The proposed bill 
addresses this concern among other 
matters.
The principles
The principles included in the bill have 
been criticised by George Tanner because 
they are too briefly stated whereas the 
underlying jurisprudence reflects great 
complexity that cannot be rendered down 
into simple statements. This, he argues, 
invites novel interpretations as new 
meanings may be imported by the courts. I 
am not a lawyer but this is very surprising. 
The Ten Commandments did not seem to 
be compromised by a lack of attention to 
interpretative detail and why courts could 
be expected to attribute novel meanings 
to well-established principles just because 
they are stated simply is unclear. The state 
of Queensland has fundamental principles 
for a similar purpose. 
Another criticism is that the bill gives 
no guidance as to how the principles are 
to be traded off in situations where they 
potentially conflict. I cannot see how it 
could do this, as the number of possible 
trade-offs that might be faced would be 
very large. Legislators trade off competing 
principles all the time. The bill would 
invite them to be clearer about this. The 
possibility that a superior court might 
form a view about whether parliament 
has been clear about why it has set aside 
one or more principles in a particular 
case should be a worry only to the extent 
that one thinks the courts might do this 
incompetently. Yet even if that unworthy 
fear is realised, it is hard to see what the 
policy problem would be, given that a 
government minister would then find 
it easy to rebut any resulting pressure to 
revisit the legislation. The courts have 
no powers to change the legislation or 
interfere with its implementation as 
a result of the bill. Guidelines issued 
under clause 15 of the bill would assist 
in applying the principles, as would 
government decisions on the application 
of the principles in particular cases, and 
Regulations Review Committee and court 
decisions. The meaning of the principles 
in operation would be elucidated in this 
context in a considered manner for the 
benefit of future policy makers.
Some critics say the principles are 
not universally accepted and reflect a 
neo-liberal view of the role of the state. 
However, the principles are really nothing 
more than a ‘plain English’ statement of 
very long-established elements of our law, 
as evidenced by the LAC guidelines and 
other sources. 
There is, of course, ample room for 
discussion as to whether the statement of 
the principles in the bill could be improved 
if more minds were brought to bear on 
them in good faith. The taskforce debated 
the statement of the liberty principle at 
length, with a strong view being expressed 
that an even shorter statement than the 
one adopted would be better. The point 
is that the statement of a principle is 
one thing and the discussion of accepted 
applications of and departures from it is 
another. For example, the statement of 
the simple commandment ‘thou shalt not 
kill’ leaves the examination of whether 
it applies to plants and animals or times 
of war or self-defence to another place. 
The taskforce catered for the need for 
clarification or elaboration by providing in 
the proposed bill for ministerial guidelines 
to be promulgated. Some of the critics 
of the proposed principles seem to have 
overlooked this mechanism for answering 
their objections. 
Another suggestion is that the merits 
appeal provisions could be limited by 
excluding circumstances where such 
review is impractical. Again, this looks 
like confusion between the statement 
of the principle and a statement of valid 
reasons for departing from it. Under the 
proposed bill, the minister would state 
that merit appeal was not being provided 
for because it would be impractical to 
provide it in the particular case. Just being 
difficult to provide should not, of course, 
be reason enough to exclude appeal rights. 
The discretion in immigration policy, for 
example, is an area where appeal processes 
involve complex judgments of individual 
human circumstances, but also an area 
where oversight of the use of discretion 
through appeal is essential. 
Another suggestion 
is that the merits 
appeal provisions 
could be limited 
by excluding 
circumstances 
where such review 
is impractical.
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The property right principle is not as 
innovative as some critics have suggested. 
It extends the protection of land under 
the Public Works Act to a wider definition 
of property. I have already responded in 
another article to a point made by Richard 
Ekins that the concept of compensation 
for impairment of property is new 
(Wilkinson and Scott, 2010). It already 
exists as ‘injurious affection’ and ‘damage’ 
in the Public Works Act, and was in the 
Town and Country Planning Act. 
Common law and the role of the courts
Critics of the bill seem to take a hard line 
on the role of the courts in commenting on 
the quality of legislation. Elements of the 
argument are that judge-made common 
law has receded into near insignificance in 
New Zealand: we are now a country run 
by statute and parliament reigns supreme. 
One critic asserts that ‘statute law is not 
only king but emperor’. The implication 
is that there has been a very rapid decline 
in the common law influence since the 
2001 drafting of the LAC guidelines, 
which require consideration of whether 
fundamental common law principles have 
been respected and describe statute law as ‘a 
continent within the ocean of the common 
law’. With the common law diminished to 
near insignificance, the argument goes 
that parliament is supreme and that for 
courts to form views – albeit without legal 
consequences – on legislation is to bring 
the courts into the political domain and to 
risk their independence. Their role is only 
to interpret laws in accordance with what 
parliament intended, regardless of their 
conformity with common law principles.
This view, which was in evidence at the 
seminar, looks revolutionary, is contrary 
to the LAC guidelines, is inconsistent with 
the approach of section 6 of New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act, and would, I am sure, 
come as an unpleasant surprise to most 
of those New Zealanders who think about 
these things. No doubt there are subtleties 
in this position that I am missing, not 
being a constitutional lawyer. But one does 
not have to resort to the florid argument 
that much of what was done by the Nazis 
was legal to raise concerns over the risk 
from poor legislation to the welfare of 
New Zealanders arising from the exercise 
of power by the government restrained 
only by an obedient civil service and a 
somewhat supine parliament.
Protection of the rights of the 
minority from the will of the majority is 
fundamental to sustaining civil society 
and thereby democracy. The rule of law 
does not mean that any law a legislative 
body passes is beyond rebuke by the 
courts, even in a country without a written 
constitution and with a preponderance 
of statute over common law. The rule 
of law and the protection of citizen 
rights are intertwined, as is explained 
simply and powerfully in a recent book 
by Tom Bingham, an eminent British 
judge (Bingham, 2010). He explains how 
a commitment to the rule of law implies 
a commitment to the observance of 
fundamental rights, and acknowledges the 
possibility that parliament might pass laws 
that are not sufficiently respectful of them. 
Given that the courts have established 
expertise in the finer points of the rule of 
law and are operated under requirements 
of great transparency and pressure for 
consistency, they are the natural parties to 
provide opinions on these matters. 
Bad laws are more than a theoretical 
possibility. The non-transparent and 
chaotic use of regulatory powers in the 
economic realm in the early 1980s under 
the Economic Stabilisation Act, the 
National Development Act, the Public 
Finance Act and the Reserve Bank Act 
caused great economic harm. More recent 
episodes over the foreshore and seabed 
legislation, the anti-terrorism legislation 
and the campaign Finance legislation 
show that parliament can pass legislation 
it quickly regrets and barely bothers to 
defend when the consequences of poor 
policy and drafting become apparent. The 
anti-terrorism legislation was particularly 
disturbing in this regard. No one took any 
responsibility for passing a law that the 
solicitor-general stated after the fact was 
not capable of implementation. These are 
not trivial issues either, as these acts have 
fundamental consequences for property 
rights, democratic rights and civil rights. 
Our parliament should not get these 
things so badly wrong. 
Also, tension between the will of 
the majority and principles of good law 
making is not a remote and rare event, 
but a day-to-day affair. The recent debate 
over the government’s welfare reform 
requiring some but not all beneficiaries 
to be the subject of work requirements 
is a typical example. The minister said 
that most people would agree with the 
changes, which may well be right, but 
where a fundamental principle about 
non-discrimination may be involved 
it would be no bad thing for the policy 
makers to have stronger incentives to 
think through the trade-off being made, 
and to be transparent about how they view 
it and possibly subject to authoritative 
comment. At the time of writing it would 
seem that there is similarly a need for 
greater clarity about how principles of 
non-discrimination are being applied 
or traded off in the development of 
legislation for the whänau ora policy. 
Some of the opponents of the 
taskforce’s bill would likely respond to 
these concerns by arguing that democracies 
make mistakes, and fix some of them; 
that there are other ways to deal with 
these issues; and that the courts have no 
place in commenting on whether laws are 
consistent with well-established principles 
of good law in a democratic society. But 
what the courts are invited to do by the bill 
is not to interfere with the laws themselves 
but to use their accumulated knowledge 
and wisdom to make declarations, which 
are binding on no one, if they are of the 
view that a law is inconsistent with these 
principles. This is about transparency 
in relation to established principles that 
judges are best placed to consider. This 
no more politicises the courts than their 
Some of the 
opponents of 
the taskforce’s 
bill would likely 
respond to these 
concerns by arguing 
that democracies 
make mistakes, and 
fix some of them ...
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long-established judicial review powers 
do. 
Furthermore, courts already have 
the power to make declarations about 
consistency with section 19 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act (freedom from 
discrimination), and probably also other 
provisions of that act. United Kingdom 
courts have made declarations about 
compatibility with the Bill of Rights Act 
there. Critics note that this is backed by 
European constitutional arrangements 
that render the example irrelevant to New 
Zealand, although many of the rights in 
question are ones that are precious to New 
Zealanders as well.
Implementation and administration
There has been resistance within the 
bureaucracy to the bill on the grounds 
that the capability to do the work is low. 
Obviously, this is a transitional matter 
of resource management and capability 
development, other things being equal. 
The taskforce viewed the potential rate of 
return on improved business regulation 
in particular as being very high if the bill 
contributed to even a small improvement 
in productivity. Much of the cost would 
be in reallocating existing expenditure by 
changing the methods of policy analysis to 
incorporate consideration of the matters 
in the bill. If parliament does legislate 
for improved quality of legislation, then 
public servants will have to add capability 
in regard to these requirements to the 
skill requirements of policy advisers. 
That they do not have it now when most 
of it is already required under the LAC 
guidelines, regulatory impact statements 
and the Cabinet Manual is disappointing. 
The taskforce recommends that the 
implementation of the bill would be 
controlled by the relevant minister, who 
could phase its introduction to match the 
build-up of analytical capability. 
In order to ensure that the bill provides 
a positive influence on dynamic change in 
the policy advisory system over time, its 
provisions are designed to support and add 
strength to the incentives to lift the quality 
of policy development. If it is to succeed it 
would work with the grain of the policy 
development system by being embedded 
in the processes and in the methods of 
analysis, along with everything else these 
contain. Otherwise, there would be some 
validity to the criticism, fairly made in 
respect of the LAC guidelines, that the 
bill would lead to check-box compliance 
that undermines the achievement of its 
objectives. The bill’s implicit requirement 
for all legislation to be examined for 
consistency with the principles within 
ten years has aroused particular criticism 
as being unrealistic. George Tanner notes 
that it took 15 years to revise the Income 
Tax Act, as an example of the level of 
effort imposed by this clause. But the 
bill does not require all legislation to be 
revised within that period. After ten years 
a court declaration in respect of an act 
could be applied for. If that application is 
successful, examination of that act could 
be brought forward, and surely should be 
brought forward.
Alternatives to legislation
The dominant view in the select 
committee consideration of the original 
bill was that self-imposed measures by 
executive government had been shown 
not to work, and there is the experience 
of other countries to support this view. 
The view of the taskforce was aligned with 
this in the sense that, while it saw merit 
in the moves the government is making 
to improve its regulatory performance, 
it recommended a legislative footing to 
underpin these changes and to overcome 
the resistance within government that has 
rendered past efforts at self-improvement 
disappointing. The taskforce also 
recommended that the standing orders 
be modified to reflect a more robust role 
for the Regulations Review Committee. 
This could, for example, put roadblocks 
in the way of hidden taxes and excessive 
delegations of parliament’s powers, such 
as happened, in my opinion (expressed 
to the select committee at the time), 
in connection with the creation of the 
Electricity Commission. Legislating for a 
set of principles will provide a stronger 
footing for parliament’s measures to 
improve the quality of legislation. This 
footing seems necessary – remembering 
that standing orders can be amended 
or even suspended very simply and so 
amendments to the orders on their own 
may not be a sufficiently strong protection 
for the principles. 
Conclusion
Support for the bill was more evident 
in the select committee than in the 
Institute of Policy Studies seminar. But 
it is more important in the progress of 
the debate over it for the proponents to 
test their arguments against their critics 
than to recite from their supporters. The 
seminar was a useful step in this process, 
and I hope that coming debate over the 
issues raised by the bill will sift the wheat 
from the chaff and isolate and refine what 
really is in contention. 
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